tv The Road to Somewhere CSPAN July 30, 2017 12:01am-1:43am EDT
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[inaudible] [inaudible] >> welcome to the hudson institute. i am john, senior fellow and director of the center for american, culture. hudson promotes american leadership in global engagement for secure, free, prosperous future. we were founded in 1961 by strategist herman con. we challenge thinking and help with transitions of the future through disciplinary studies and defense, international relations, economics, we are delighted to host british journalist, author, think tank or david goodhart. he is currently the head of a demography unit a policy change think tank. his former editor of prospect magazine and former director of the centerleft he most.
his previous book successes and failures the postwar immigration was a runner-up. david has written a powerful book, the road to somewhere, the populist revolt of the future politics. you can see on amazon and elsewhere. britain, like the united states is culturally divided. it's a culturally divided nation. her other probes this with considerable skill. he presents an argument on the crucial issues of brexit, immigration, assimilation, globalization and national identity. he takes on social forces that are not used to being criticized. he is a man of considerable courage. on my own review it will appear national review soon. i'll introduce my hudson colic who will have an exchange with david after his presentation.
there is little doubt that the road to somewhere will have a significant, positive impact on the policy debates in the english-speaking world. david, why don't you take it away. >> thank you. >> thank you for that introduction. everyone seems to be giving up the par points. i just discover their value. as john said, i have written this book about the value divided british society and what i talk about as a bearing in all developed democracies. including the united states. the value divided britain has
had a particularly destabilizing effect on our politics. a destabilizing effect that led to very unexpected vote to leave the european union. the very fact that it was a shock it's a testament to those who are living in our country since brexit has rise in europe there has been a lot of analysis and that this area. a lot of it focusing on educational value divide. so someone of i say will be familiar to you. you'll find some distinctive lines of argument in it. i'll touch on the question of
why it is happening now. some of these have been with us for many generations. why wait experiencing the snow and the very important point, what we do about it and how do we move on and create new settlements. let me give you a sketch of the value divide i'm talking about, particularly in the u.k. but with a broader application i hope. i talk in the book about the distinction between what i call the people from anywhere. that is by the way 20 or 25% of the population. i'm not just talking about metropolitan elite. i'm really talking about the groups that have become a lot bigger in recent years. they tend to be highly educated and mobile.
overwhelmingly with the university most with the influence of london and the city that sex in many people and particularly with professional careers. so you have this educated, mobile group that's growing very rapidly in recent times. they tend to value openness, autonomy, adaptive, and they tend to have again part of the causes of they tend to have weak attachments to place in good. this of course is can contrasted with the other large group and irish society. people who has the term
suggests, they tend to be less educated and tentative value familiarity, peculiarity, and tend to have stronger group attachments to nature, ethnicity, their own people. there is a parallel binary concept that i think helps to flush out the distinction which comes from the american psychologist i mentioned his name in a few places. think policy when i said the university they would grimace with his name. you produce these still books but he did come up with a useful bindery when thinking about
human identity. he talked about the spectrum to achieve -- and they have identities meaning that whatever they have comes from what they achieved in my. they have successful careers, that means the sense of yourself is relatively protected and secure in their for your intended to you can take anywhere. if anything, identities primarily undescribed identity, if you come from a certain place and belong to a certain group, then your identity is much more easily disturbed by social change. i think it's a very important distinction. the two key distinctions when talking about the new instability is the ability to
serve social change and an attachment to grief. i wanted to sound too simplistic and in some respects it is it's useful to boil it down to something simple, but as often there is if you read my book you'll find plenty of light and shade. there is a huge variety both on the spectrum of anywhere that i call global villages. the people who would say go to a small but eccentric crew. in the bottom end of somewhere
you have a genuine xenophobes who really in a were against the modern world. i also talk by the way of a very large and between group, but 25% of the group or chastise two things that emphasize about -- i am vented the labels but i have not really invented the value black. they are there, i have not done working with you. if you look at the british social attitude surveys taken over the last decade or two. if you interrogate these you'll come up with roughly the kind proportions. you can argue about the exact proportions i have attributed to
the anywhere and somewhere in subgroup. they're probably at the edges but they really are there in the data. another thing i would really strongly emphasizes that both of these groups are entirely legitimate. at least in their mainstream variations and therein lies the tragedy of politics. it's because they are in some respects, fundamentally -- want to go into the third slide. i will come back to the second one. i'll briefly touch on the question of why now. why is this emerging now?
a lot of your thinking that we boys have these divisions. there have always been more better educated, more mobile, better travel people have more experience in the world. people who have a more fear of the outside. and that's true i would say there's two important reasons why this emerge now us such essentialist. the first reason applies to the u.s. the first reason for the u.k. and much of europe is that we have shifted last generation of so for politics being dominated by socioeconomic framework. units of politics, social class levels of public spending, arguments about equality and inequality. this is not gone away and some
people argue the last election a few weeks in britain takes us back to a two-party system. it does take it to that but i would argue about the values analysis still works it works very well applied to the. but, what is happened is that we have seen the emergence of what i would call sociocultural politics, security and identity issues the last decade or so. this is happened partly in response to a much greater openness of our economy cultures the last 20 or 30 years with globalization, with european union integration in the u.k. and europe.
with much more experimental fear into the bowels of our politics from the outside. consequential feelings of people have of reductions in national sovereignty and a degree of powerlessness. you have also seen just a simple increase in the number. it's the product of huge expansion of higher education that's already happening. the magnification of higher education. it's a narrow story in the u.k. think is slightly less in the u.s. because of the great importance of race or religion in u.s. politics over many centuries. but even so, think hereto and
you may say this may be a reverse order, that it could be the return for social class in america. what we have been worried more about seems to do with boundaries and ethnicity in a way that was more familiar in the u.s. anyway, focusing on the u.k. this politics has created a magnified ring to the divisions that i've been talking about. and it has led to this instability. the underlying cause i would argue of the surprise that brexit bow. but just to go back, you look at
the value divided in terms of politics, what is been going on i would argue is these anywhere value group, the large -- that it is has come more and more to dominate our politics and indeed our policies over the last generation or so, applying the least ideology of what i call it's the value group in general by the way are separate, they're all the same thing. they are also self to finance working-class and they would identify as middle-class, there's also a lot of middle-class somewhere so there's working-class anywhere's, although not very many.
they overlap the distinct categories and people with actions drive as much if not more from these values and aspirations more traditional and socioeconomic class positions. one final point i want to emphasize here and one thing that i think has led to the disillusionment of politics and to withdraw from politics of a large section of the somewhere value black is the failure of the reviewers to understated in this emotional attachment to understand the somewhere values without caricature as liberals.
i call the political ideology of somewheres decent populism. someone thinks this contradiction in terms. i don't think it is. because if the somewhere group has probably gone along with what i called the great liberalization of last 40 years or so. you just go back to the 1980s and what now seems like extraordinary reaction reviews that people had about many aspects of everyday cultural life, think in britain in the mid- 80s about 65% of the population that that home technology was wrong. and i think now 70% to 5% were for gay marriage. you've seen a huge change in attitude and race, gender, sexuality in the u.k. some of the patterns here in the u.s.
but, they haven't let it. but they are not liberals. they still they still have much stronger national attachment much more strongly attached in the benefit for social contact in a way that millennial's often don't. they would be opposed to large-scale immigration in the europe. they're not opposed to immigrants but those sales such and such a parties anti- immigrant. sometimes they are but really my experience people are into large-scale immigration because they don't feel like it benefits them economically or culturally.
rapid changed neighborhoods, most people don't like. this is perhaps different. you have to go back to the 1960s and 70s. they were many more bigoted attitudes that. it's about sending people home now it's about reducing the rate of the fluid people also you have a stronger attachment to come in social norms in our society. the more anxious about welfare, they often have or traditional, not really old-fashioned use of family, but the compromise if it were, one might call modified gender division of labor. so not going for utilitarian model weather equal but essentially the same.
but the large majorities of people, the large majority of women in britain went to reliable, main breadwinner mail when they have young children. they want to spend time bringing up children without going to work. it's actually about making it possible for people to spend time with their families. i want to stress that balance. the decency of much somewhere thinking. and yet, the alienation of somewheres has been the defining factor in this popular search. it is fundamentally to do with
-- is the anywhere domination of our cultural society by anywhere priorities. you'll have to go back 40 or 50 years in a country like britain british common sense was somewhere common sense. now, it is at least in the public realm anywhere. you just have to go through the main -- and british life. and start with the economy. the very phrase tells you about how things have changed in the economy. they're highly educated people and meanwhile we see the emergence of this hourglass labor market along with middling jobs that gave somewheres protections rent disappeared. this is one of the absolutely fundamental causes, brother
support of our cultural and economic analysis of these factors that i'm talking about. much of the time the two things are so intertwined that what were talking about is essentially the reduce huge reduction of employment last two or three decades. and there are those disappearing, someone said to this me since i read this book, we tend to pass over the skilled manual jobs that we have associated with large manufacturing enterprises. somebody who did one of those jobs a few years ago said to me something i found in lightning. he said the thing about the kind of job i get to do so you don't need a huge amount of capability to do well. what you didn' did need is a lof
experience. so someone who couldn't just walk up my street and do it as well as i can do. in that sense of experience give you state of protection. so much of that is gone. in the labor market. i think so much so that i calculated the other day, it's very rough, about 80 or 85% of jobs in the u.k. now require -- or can be done after half an hour training. and what this is all about, the absolute central fact is looking at the rise of cognitive ability is the gold standard of socialist theme in our society.
this is something along argument about that is never central to the political -- as it should've been. the critique of a society run by paternalistic, cognitive elites, leads who think this is the opposite one of the main things of charles murray famous book, the bell curve disappeared under crowd, but the book is about the issue of the problem of cognitive elites lifting themselves from the rest of society. you have the economy dominated. you have education policy, huge
focus on higher education. higher education is by definition an anywhere domain. meanwhile, in the u.k. we've had continuing neglect of technical vocation information. in the options for school in britain anyway, all of the public subsidies is pushing people into the university and into the higher education route. in the other part remains relative. we have simply had a huge opening of our economies. the promises that were made of
the new democrat, new labor promise of the 80s and 90s with tony blair britain was somewheres were told to roll with globalization and we will be fine. we will turn you into software engineers and retraining. this promise was never fulfilled it's one of absolute issues here. take the freedom of movement in europe. one of the biggest reasons -- think of how differently it affects, if you're anywhere they have offices in berlin, amsterdam, you work in one of these offices any bureaucratic work permit is wonderful and easy, enhances your life. as a huge amount of competition. if you work in a food production it's a different story.
it employs 400,000 people. 120,000 issued in central europe. quite extraordinary change. you don't have to dislike on both sides but the fact of holding down your wages, competition for social housing, public services and so on. this is not something you have your life. you're very unlikely to have the aptitude to work in the fishing factory in slovakia. by which you. i've test some family policy earlier. i think family policy has been dominated by the influx of professional couples or professional women. minimizing impact on professional female careers.
particularly legitimate cause. i'm in favor of women on board. there's a lot of moderate and average men who want to be replaced by women. no question about that. but with all the focus on that area we've neglected the fact that the working class family is disintegrating both in the u.k. and parts of the u.s. too. we have no fiscal support for the family. i think you do have some arrangements here. people bringing up children together are not allowed to share their tax alone does the european countries. for historical reasons we don't. even the conservative party is not about to introduce it. they spend more time and effort with women are more than they do about helping middle and lower income families stay together. . .
enormous pressures in politics and i think it does sort of shows how -- one of the reasons why private realm has been culturally downgraded in our society. and behind that lie i think so many of our central problems. not the only cause but certainly not -- in the last election because of the weakening of family obligations. he housing crisis is because so many new householders are created when families break up. one of the arguments for -- people have to macfor immigration is our populationers are shrinking and we need more people. they're shrinking because we're having so few children. why? because we make so it hard for families to stay together and nurture. at the neck to -- technocratic
state. a quick couple more points and then a brief reflection and then have a discussion. we can talk about this more later. just related to the social ability has come to be seen in the uk is a big leap. the way the social -- the way it's remant sized and talk about -- romanticized and talk about is by the people who have gone from the counselor state, the projects, the counselor state to the elite opportunity to the professional career, and by definition, only relatively small numbers of people can do that. if you have an image of social mobility that is so all or
nothing, it's kind of depressing. the vast majority of people who can't make that huge leap, there used to by more opportunity for sort of smaller hierarchical progressions that i think we anything -- neglect at our peril, and in the uk the idea of joining the anywhere class, is about leaving. it's about leaving your home town essentially. the overwhelming residential universities, you have to leave in order to thrive and that's such a sad thing. a lot of people don't want to leave. i they like where they come from, where they have their friends and get their free child care from. i thought absolutely awful speech given by the british education secretary, justin greening, just a few weeks ago to the social mobility
commission and britain and she came from a former steel town and talked about how she used to dream of owning her own house, having a decent job, a challenging career. i realize i couldn't have any of those things in a town of 120,000 people. the idea you can't live a kind of achieved life in a town of 120,000 people is a very depressing fact about british authority. the fact that the secretary of state thinks that and thinks it's fine to talk in that way was very, very depressing. let me wind up. you might be thinking, well, okay, the only way are -- someone surely have something to say in what is going on and it's true, the voice is not stymied. the two largest newspapers in
print reflect a world view. there are a few little areas the policy spectrum where influence has played an important role and the fact the prinze prince -- prisons are overflowing, and welfare caps. the fact the governments hand been trying and not succeeding to bring down immigration is because they've been telling pollsters they think immigration is too high or much too high. the overrealming domination of our politics, i hope i have made that opinion. what do we do? what are the kind of grounds for
a -- we have had this unexpected backlash. somewhere stopped voting. the reason why people were so surprised by the brexit vote us because 3 million people vote inside brexit referendum who had not voted in general eelections the preceding four or five general election is. took the pollsters by surprise, but haven't been voting in general elections because they said, with some legitimacy, you're all the same. the political parties all reflect the double liberalism that emerged in the '80s and '90s when the they accepted the reagan-thatcher reforms in economics and you had new kind of anywhere consensus on the liberal economics, along with a new -- the argument that the right won the economic argument
and the left won the social argument. that's true to some extent. a lot of somewheres were saying, if you went and canvassed in election terms would say what's the point of voting? you're all the same. the reverend provided the opportunity to -- referendum provided the opportunity to change that. a domestic argument that took this rather dramatic form of us leaving to the european union, the european union is an ultra anywhere institution the way it -- we can talk about this late irin the way it is against modern nationalism. it's illegal to discriminate. you cannot discriminate. have to provide exactly the same services, the same access labor markets and so on to somebody from spain as any other european citizen.
a couple of thoughts on the new -- essentially politics since brexit and britain has been an arguments between the militants anywheres, who say we are the civilized people, they're the barbarians, mustn't give an inch. this is a disaster and we must dig in, and the people who are on the side of what i'd call the admonished anywheres, people who are saying we have this wrong. we haven't been listening to enough people and now we're experiencing this backlash, people have lashed out and we're now having to sort out our withdrawal from the eu, and we have to listen to people, have to somehow build the somewhere voice more strongly into our politics. one way is compulsory voting and kole picks so focused on small number of constituentties or
districts in states and the groups that overwhelmingly vote in large numbers, like all the people. if we had compulsory voting might help that. i think one to the crucial things here is the way in which you can argue it's about equality, racial, gender, sexuality, equality, have become sort of separate and seen in opposition to strong group attachments. i think it's possible to have both. indeed necessary to have both. human beings remain group creatures. everybody knows that there are certain groups they feel more comfortable amongst, people like themselves, whether it's due to their education level or background or ethnicity. you can share a common set of interests and experiences with. nothing wrong with that. i think anywhere in the doctrine many people feel goal about feeling comfortable amongst
certain kinds of people, but that doesn't have to mean that you dislike other people. i think we sort of have that whole argument out of kilter and it's become too divided and to associated with the two different value groups and we need to brick them together -- bring them together. that's actually why the ethnic minorities in britain, are one of the potential sort of bridges between anywhere and somewhere value groups. that's what we loor -- we're looking for bridge issues and this case bridge groups, in the uk tend to be socially conservative, onmore religious than the white majority, often have much stronger family connects, just sort of physically where the alive, often more rooted, although the whole population is relatively
rooted. 60% of british people still live within 20 miles of where they lived when they were 14. we're somewhat less mobile society than the u.s. it's a very important role in the coming years for ethnic minorities who are sort of kind of in britain partly because of the openness. trojan horse in some sways for somewhere values and somewhere rootedness, and environmentalism is another possible bridge issue. we can talk about that. just to finish, i think what -- was very impressed when discovered that the famous quote from the american sociologist daniel bell who talk about being a social democrat in economics but -- being an american, think he thought the regulated economy, a liberal in politics
and conservative on social and cultural issues and i think that kind of corresponds to what one might call the hidden majority in our society. for historical and contingent reasons no, party has ever emerged to provide that option. actually the last election in britain, the conservative party tried to come close to that, and for various reasons, although the conservative party shared the vote wend up sharply, labor did unexpectedly well, too, which tarnished the conservative performance. just the very final point. there are places in the world where the balance betters than perhaps we have in the anglosaxon societies. germany is one. we are always looking to germany as the more -- but unfortunately germans do seem to have got it more right than us.
germany doesn't have a london or great global universities which i income in some ways is an advantage here. they kind of -- the local and the middling have greater value in and status in germany. great technical institutions, they have the great apprentice ship system so even the lonely shop workadays three-year apprentice ship. gives boom the prestige and the memory of those guilds institutions still lingering on to give status to middling and lower skilled jobs. the whole lender system, the fact -- even the way they talk in germany, the combination, i if you're out and beside in germany you speech deutsche. if you come from a small town, at home you speak some incomprehensible dialect. their very language has a kind of settlement in some ways
between anywhereness and somewhere sunrise the place in the world -- just occurred to me that kind of most represents this sort of settlement between these two value groups is bavaria. lederhosen. it's an -- one of the richest parts of europe and very socially conservative. the symbol of leader hosen. -- lederhosen. how ridiculous. it's run bill the christian union, and yet has munich. a liberal and dynamic city, and they've managed to be genuinely pluralistic and has a conservative image. the problem with a lot of anywhere liberalism is it's been
the kind of ill liberal libballism. it has not had enough sensitivity for the needs, the economic and the values, the cultural needs of people who are not part of that 20% to 25%. let me stop there. the talk is over. thank you very much. in. [applause] >> walter russell mead. going to have a few comments and questions. a distinguished fellow at the hudson institute, james clark, professor of foreign affairs and humanities bard college, and the author of god and gold, and his next book is the arc of the covenant, united states, israel, and the fate of the jewish people.
>> well, next year i should say unfortunately, are for the book publication. dave we have known each other quiet quite a while and i've admired your work for a long time and i think even more with this latest book. i thought you had a sentence today that really resonated in america, perhaps more than you know, the phrase "culture trumps economics." in the united states. particularly with the capital t on the trump. i think we saw in the paper this morning, think, that president trump overruled virtually his entire cabinet in order to impose some tariffs on steel or to move in that direction. so, culture trumps economics. a lot of what you are talk about seems to me to come down to the question of elite failures or
the -- we have created this kind of mass elite with the mass university system so that in both britain and the united states, and many other countries, the elite is a lot -- is a bigger percentage of the population than it used to be, but it lacks some of the sense you called of the paternalism of down en, you talk about in the queen and for privilege equals duty and duty to those who don't share your river. privilege. that's why the monarchy is popular, symbol of this. the new elite is i think less secure than the old elite in the sense, down abbey will be fine
and you don't have to squeeze the's sans so hard to keep it going but if you're a professional building a career, an upper middle class professional you're feeling under siege and are more concerned perhaps with getting ahead and making it for yourself than on reflecting on what you owe other people, your duty as kind of focused on your career to some degree, and the concept then of meritocracy as the opposite of privilege and is justifying, if i'm better than anybody, then i'm entitled to be richer than anybody and also those people out there who don't make it, they're kind of schlups and the character defects, bad choices, low iq, who cares. aim getting this right?
you're really looking at a kind of elite failure as one of the key issues? >> absolutely. i think that is a large part of my talk about, and a kind of -- yes, kind of self-regard because -- not all are liberals in the american sense, not all sort of on the left. many are center right. but i think there is -- what they do share a kind of failure of empathy and imagination in some ways. perhaps the old class system for all of its obvious failings, perhaps requires that there was a connection. people wanted to become literally physically disconnected from me middling and poor people in our society. at one time the elites used to
employ them when they had a face-to-face relationship, which is partly the decline of kind of physical production and manufacturing. that relationship is no longer there or in the armed forces or other national institutions. the classes and the value groups came together and then had a relationship. it eroded. think we need to kind to learn a new language to think about the domination of both cognitive elites and how we -- we don't want to kind of lurch into a liberalism or squash the anywheres the anywheres are the most dynamic -- we are all anywheres, i suspect, but we don't want to self-harm, it's anywheres who are the social change and source of dynamism in
our society. we don't want to tip over in the other direction but we require anyone to do better. we have a chance now. we have been warned. we have had these two extraordinary events in 2016. brexit and trump. they may turn out to be blips and kind of life will go on as normal. some people claim -- didn't do as well as expect in the netherlandses and in the british election has made -- but i think we should quite on the contrary see it as a warning sign that we could face even greater forms of alienation if we don't respond to the legitimate political signal represented by brexit and trump.
>> part of the critique of this elite space was almost a radical antisense of meritocracy. that is to say democratic in the since of genuinely believing in the equal worth of all people, regardless of iq or social class or wealth. there's a -- in a religious context you'd say, the equality of all people before god who judges equally and who thinks that the cleaning lady in your apartment block is as important as you are, and you are accountable for your treatment of her and you better respect her. and that does seem to be a little bit less present in the way that some of the anywheres think of the somewheres. >> i wonder if that is true. a kind of everyday sense of democratic equalities has weakened in recent times, part best because of this point about
the domination of cultural able becoming the gold senator of -- standard of socialist steam. we have create new forms of operating and just to reinforce the point you made earlier, i have never seen any reef search on this and i'd like to do some myself. if anyone out the would like to fund it. but i think it is my hunch that in britain, anyway, nobody -- actually nobody goes to a prestigious university, very few people have close friends who are not graduates. i think the kind of bifurcation -- the divergence of our social networks, reinforced perhaps by people -- as people often say by the internet and the kind of bubble culture of
the internet, but i think -- again through particularly true in britain because of leaving home. leaving home to become an anywhere. and i saw this -- you see this in the contempt, neimi e-mail chains after brexit, you had left wing professors saying why did we give these people the vote without some kind of iq test? it was sort of astonishing. i don't think if people -- perhaps this is less true in america -- half of all students still live at home in the u.s., so it may be that people have a -- you're kind of high school friends friends and your college friends can kind of merge together. you don't necessarily have that same break we tend to have in the uk in terms of social networks, but i certainly -- some reaction to trump were not that dissimilar to what i
described as the left-wing professors in brexit. >> maybe we should throw it open. >> one more just -- when you said parsons, the name -- who had this theory of two different types of characterishing, the necessary and elite, the foxes s and the lions. the fogs were like the anywheres. they were mobile, innovative but they had negative qualities, sometimes involved in financial fraud and bowling both sites had positive and negative. lions preyed on group persistence, the queen, the flag and so on, but they had negative qualities, they could be brutal.
and the point was circulation of elites is what he called and you need this constant kirk layings between foxes and -- circulation between foxes and lions and the problem he saw after the first world war was the domination of the folks and you need more lions. >> got them in the '30s. >> too many lions. and then the eu is now almost total foxes. >> i didn't know that. i saw you mentioned it in the review. i will definitely look that up. there are the famous gazelle -- 19th century german psychologist who had -- how somewhere and anywhere and more kind of intimate community, i suppose, and gazelle is society, more abstract -- >> more transactional. >> yes. okay, we can go to the audience.
give -- this is on c-span, give your name and affiliation if you have any affiliation. we report start with the gentleman in the first row here, red tie. >> carl. you made reference to today.com. actually one of the greatest gifts the world england has given was william continuedale translated the true is translation interest english of the world testament the world has known but the book title "god and -- --" we can address the issue of banking and all this money as it affects the stratification of society. >> start over? >> the question quickly. >> well, god and gold. biblically, against usury, the building of money on interest
which is created this stratification of the elites who can enforce contracts that create an impoverishment who have to pay back debt usry. i concluded that it seems that the too big to prosecute and to big to fail bank are funded though money lawn laundering traceable to drug tracking and the question -- >> the question? >> we have god and gold. >> i think usury is always a problem. generally held in western civilization to be about excessive interest rather than interest at all. but i think in general levels of financial fraud are problems, finance transparency is a problem. i wouldn't say right now that big banks that are made large by drug money laundering are in
fact the domino factor in our financial system. >> okay. this -- city you -- >> i'm steve buckingham, former -- this question is for david goodhart. i have been hearing you describe the united states, i don't have much involvement with britain but sounds like the united states. the education bubble in the it's, which i think like a lot of other bubbles look the housing bubble, has created economic and cultural turmoil. ...
>> you have bernie sanders getting close to political power in the u.s. and one of the big appeals and the dissolution of student tuition fees and people already pay back their tuition fees. this is writing a massive check to the middle and upper class. he was also proposing the benefits of him but designed thadesign thatput together a prg
to lots of different groups but nonetheless the political class will have noticed the popularity of the tuition fees. it happened relatively quickly in the uk but the culture and political power is the understudied subject indeed. it was brought in for the first time we talked about the universities in cambridge and now about 20% have a substantial element.
some sort of deal must inherently be a good thing. we have to come together to kind of negotiate and protect ourselves from the global bond markets that even the top ten to 15% understand and see the rationality and often benefit from but the cure is worse than the disease and it doesn't make a difference to me so it is less
of a role in the uk politics. minority integration is another in terms of caring about it. it's more easily disturbed by the whole neighborhoods. they will think that's fine of course people will come together but because they have less of a sense of an ethnic identity themselves or the common norms or common way of life they are
less disturbed by the consequences. a >> let me sharpen that point just a little bit. what struck me i was thinking of one of the comments in the book you said it would be easier if eventually to assimilate 100,000 australians as opposed to 100,000 afghans say you could get a tremendous pushback. this is the difference between the anywhere and somewhere attitude and it makes sense what you're saying so maybe the
different types of societies people come from do make a difference and how dare you even bring this up and others would say this is common sense we have a situation with gordon brown and a woman a couple years back so try to give me a chance to think about this a little better. better. >> that is a really good point actually. was it undermines is this return to the different attitudes of the group identities and liberals. if you sort of even believe in the social class but when it comes to the cultural society in britain and much of europe it becomes individualistic around a collection of individuals what difference can i possibly make a
buck some don't see it like that but they see it as a kind of home. it is an economic lens or cultural lens. there's no such thing as society and the difficulties and all that kind of stuff so they can genuinely believe what anybody knows it is easier to integrate a. it is a cultural way of life shared in certain respects.
arrived they have to be treated in the same way and fellow citizens that the national system should be first in the queue for the various kinds of and that also had turned out we were leaving the european movement because we were the country to promote more than any other because it would dilute the kind of integrating force in the european union but now as you say substantially it is very important in the immigration story. quite a few people came from the 80s and 90s from india,
africa and pakistan and there was some friction we became used to it in the 80s and 90s publications, governments were able to respond to the anxieties people felt about it and bring the numbers down so by the early '90s it was actually negative and i think that was a proper response to make it easy to absorb the newcomers. after 2004 when we had the surge in eastern europe people suddenly realized the parliament could do nothing about it because it was a set of rules that he had signed up to and
[inaudible] but suddenly a lot of poor countries joined and we were the only big country to allow media access so we were suddenly hit by the big wave of people and he realized that his basic and existential as comes into the country we were not able to affect that. it's often worse than the disease. the whole point is they have different natural precedence is on things, preferences and choices you make on the attitude to risk the financial products. we disagree about these things. but when you join a club and this applies to some extend to the wto.
suddenly all these national preferences are harder to impose. you come to a messy compromise, and they may be wort it may be t if the reward is paid enough thabutwe were sacrificing natiol sovereignty and not getting enough back in return. >> in the fourth row, there are two women here. yes, you start, and then over here. >> i'm a student from london england and my question is how much would you argue that political language into the media has more to say in the vote and political participation and background context and identity? >> the media plays a bigger role -- >> then the background of
political identity and context. >> the media plays an interesting role and it's probably part of the solution. we've had a narrowing of the political culture for a year or two in the last two or three generation and it's tended to become more and more similar and political class if you will, there are people that work as interns and special advisers who then go on to become congressmen and senators and so on. so, in the talk you see the narrowing of the political ideology and things that are dominating both of the countries. and yet the big factor is that
now is a that it's somehow release, it's been completely blown away and it's very ugly overtime. it is giving a voice to people who didn't have a voice before or felt they didn't. it's early to tell the media revolution in the populist democratic media revolution. one could see this as a kind of optimistic develop and in the short term it is certainly going to make the tone of politics
uglier. but it's like the populist parties in europe. many of the populist parties in europe have been in the government minorities and coalitions. not in all cases that we know but it's compromising in the water for public supporters but they've learned politics is about difficult trade-offs and you can't have a simple populist when you are faced with the responsibilities you change your behavior and i think that's been an influence on the european populace. you might say the same thing about the fact everybody can be a publisher and have their own newspaper and to set up their
own blog were. that democratization is communication. because we are in the early stages of this kind of messy and ugly but you may see them becoming responsible people like my colleagues on the platform here. >> i am a student at the school of public service and i was just wondering something i noticed in the united states but i'm not sure if the same is true for britain. we've seen a lot of what you call certain groups of anywhere kind of using anti-intellectualism or expert sentiments as a kind of
scapegoat and harnessing that to gain a popular influence. and hugh mentioned in your talk there'there is a certain bridgee might be able to use to find compromise between the values and i was wondering if you thought we could ever kind of regular guys that sentiment. >> did you mean that they are using -- who is using the anti-intellectual sentiment? i didn't quite understand that. >> for example with the past election i guess we would all consider say president trump as an anywhere, but i think he was successful and harnessing the populist sentiment. i guess that is more what i was referring to. >> there was a famous thing during the campaign by a british
politician speak to he said that sympathetically. i think what he meant is we are not fed up with experts that [inaudible] or keep the airplane flying or that the media is people who are journalists or commentators or academics in political science or whatever. they are not neutral. they have agendas and facts and figures at their fingertips but they are not neutral. but i think it is also true that we are seeing in the last generation or two is a final
eradication of the politics of difference in our societies. you would only have to go back a few decades and there was more kind of structure and governance and politics and that is in some ways a good thing. it's not on the whole of the valuable sentiment at least as a democracy should be. but it's sort of spilled over to the into finding any form of authority just because somebody
studied the subject for 20 years, i don't care, i feel differently about itcoming and much greater importance to those attached to the sentiment and feeling and emotion. there's a long list of letters after your name and that can go too far with a long list of letters after your name. the last question refers to a common phenomenon of a wealthy person who is the leader of a populist cause. the gentleman in the last row. >> you mentioned and i have friends that each of tony the
teacher's great universities, so what are we missing? >> bthey have great technical universities but not global universities. look at what is produced by the list dominated by the u.s.. germany has great technical universities but it doesn't upgrade sort of general universities. with the exception of technical universities but they are more broad-based and general universities that don't really exist, places like heidelberg doesn't attract huge flows of students. in the 20th or the 19th century.
[inaudible] it's actually a deliberative model of policy. the government doesn't stream larger amounts of money so it doesn't have an oxford or cambridge or harvard or yale. they come here or go to britain for our education. >> i'm a student at the school of public service. so it seems that we are seeing a global trend in the rise of big men. did speak [inaudible] how do you feel that the growing chasm between the two in some ways is relating to this rise? >> there is the invitations are being governed by institutions and you can see that's where
after the death they tried deliberately to move away from a personal list of system, but the threat scared of them and you see he is behaving much more like an emperor then the chairman of the committee. and this is i think partly a result of the mediation of the internet of institutions and politics. i think one other point to make about the relationship of the beliefs and bonded leads is these days they feel a heck of a lot better and are a lot better educated than the non- elites used to be a.
then we roll over and get squashed it is a kind of necessary element of the self-restraint but that self-restraint isn't popular in the building against it. but i would say that they gave nearly 40% and this is not an overwhelming choice. similarly in london the places that were the most like the west midlands in the northeast also
no appetite for a second referendum and the conservative party did much better than expected. it's harder for scotland to be independent when britain is inside the european union. it would have been very much easier. the cost economic and otherwise rise quite dramatically and i don't expect that second referendum anytime soon. >> following england has never really been the goal. they decided to get out rather than it being squashed and the
commentators are complaining about the responsible way in which they have no jeopardized the agreement. it is an realisti on realistic e english voters to place 55 million english voters if they put an anxiety about the complicated situation before the fundamental desire to the national sovereignty i think you were judging the unfair standards if you are saying that so we don't apply it to anybody else.